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Abstract
Advances in information technology are changing public health at an unprecedented rate. Participatory surveillance systems are
contributing to public health by actively engaging digital (eg, Web-based) communities of volunteer citizens to report symptoms
and other pertinent information on public health threats and also by empowering individuals to promptly respond to them. However,
this digital model raises ethical issues on top of those inherent in traditional forms of public health surveillance. Research ethics
are undergoing significant changes in the digital era where not only participants’ physical and psychological well-being but also
the protection of their sensitive data have to be considered. In this paper, the digital platform of Influenzanet is used as a case
study to illustrate those ethical challenges posed to participatory surveillance systems using digital platforms and mobile apps.
These ethical challenges include the implementation of electronic consent, the protection of participants’ privacy, the promotion
of justice, and the need for interdisciplinary capacity building of research ethics committees. On the basis of our analysis, we
propose a framework to regulate and strengthen ethical approaches in the field of digital public health surveillance.
(J Med Internet Res 2019;21(5):e12273)   doi:10.2196/12273
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Introduction
Advances in information technology are changing medical
research [1] and public health at an unprecedented rate [2]. One
of the most evident changes is that it has become easy for
members of the general public to contribute to public health
surveillance, practice, and policy [2] by sharing personal and
health-related information through digital media. The
pervasiveness of technology is underscored by the fact that as
of 2018, almost 4 billion people are estimated to have access
to the internet [3], and there are over 318,000 health-related
mobile apps [4]. In public health surveillance (ie, public health
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data collection and analysis to inform public health practice
[5]), vast real-time health data from informal sources (eg,
health-related mobile apps and twitter) allow an early detection,
prevention, and monitoring of public health threats and the
potential for a prompt response from authorities to mitigate
them. These informal sources have facilitated the reporting of
diseases by complementing and reducing the time information
is transmitted in multilevel public health infrastructures.
Consequently, around the world, several early warning systems
are now using this innovative approach [6].
Such activities have been termed digital epidemiology or digital
disease detection [7,8]. Digital epidemiology can either be
performed for nonresearch or research purposes. On the one
hand, if the aims of the surveillance system are simply to
monitor, control, and respond to health threats by producing
data on the affected population, then this serves nonresearch
purposes. On the other hand, if the purpose of the surveillance
system is either to contribute to or to produce generalizable
knowledge, potentially applicable to different populations and
settings, then it serves research purposes [9].
Data in digital epidemiology can be obtained through 2 distinct
approaches, with similar public health objectives but usually
different challenges [10]. With a passive approach for data
collection, data subjects are not directly informed that their
everyday data (stored, eg, on social platforms, blogs, and Web
search queries) are being mined and processed by advanced
algorithms involved in big data analytics to monitor or predict
disease outbreaks [10-12]. One of the first notable examples of
such passive data collection approach to digital epidemiology
was Google Flu Trends (GFT). There are numerous challenges
to this approach, including big data hubris and unstable
algorithm dynamics. Big data hubris states that big data are
simply a replacement for data collected and analyzed by
conventional means rather than an adjunct to traditional public
health surveillance. Unstable algorithm dynamics refer to the
continuous changes made by the company to the search
algorithms, as a means of improving their searching capabilities
by incorporating, for instance, new search terms. However, as
the case of GFT demonstrated, these improvements led to biased
estimates [13]. Nonetheless, big data surveillance offers an
unprecedented opportunity to monitor in a timely manner the
spatial and temporal evolutions of epidemics with increased
granularity compared with more traditional surveillance systems,
provided that the potential flaws of big data analytics are taken
into consideration [12,13].
On the other hand, a participatory disease surveillance system
has an active approach involving digital communities of
volunteer citizens who consciously provide data. This can be
done either interactively by reporting their symptoms and other
relevant information through an appropriate interface or by
donating sensor data (eg, location traces) from their digital
devices. Such a participatory approach not only supports the
detection of potential public health threats but also empowers
individuals to reflect on them and adapt their behavior
accordingly [10]. An example of such participatory disease
surveillance system is the European Influenzanet Consortium,
which monitors influenza-like illness (ILI) activity during flu
seasons, with data from volunteer citizens using digital national
platforms and in some cases, mobile apps [14,15]. Details on
the Influenzanet Consortium and its inclusion as an adequate
model to illustrate ethical issues pertinent to participatory disease
surveillance systems have been covered in a previous publication
[16].
In 2009, the Influenzanet Consortium was formed to standardize
practices among the individual national ILI surveillance
platforms to promote collaboration [17]. Recent research started
exploring the use of crowdsourcing for detection of epidemic
flu spreading, improving the self-reporting experience of
symptoms with a more user-friendly mobile phone apps, and
enriching the data with context data recorded by the phone’s
sensors [15]. The Consortium follows the top-down model of
citizen participation [2], which guarantees the scientific
requirements and integrity of the disease surveillance network
while relying on volunteer citizens’ data. This technology-driven
public health surveillance has some benefits for its participants.
Real-time information on ILI activity at local and national levels
is provided to participants, who are also advised on strategies
for disease prevention [17,18]. Importantly, the participants
contribute directly to the ultimate goal of this public health
initiative by providing real-time granular health-related data on
ILI [19]. Such information complements the data of the
European Influenza Surveillance Network (EISN) at finer levels,
as EISN receives mainly epidemiological and virological data
from its network of general practitioners [17,18]. The large
cohorts of Influenzanet (eg, over 36,000 volunteer citizens for
the flu season 2015/2016) also allow detection of even small
epidemics of ILI [17,20]. This early detection [21] could
potentially enable timely mitigation strategies to reduce the
health burden of influenza and decrease health expenditures
associated with increased hospitalization and treatment. In
addition, Influenzanet enables research and the study of
subgroups, for example, influenza vaccine effectiveness in
vaccinated groups [22], attitudes toward vaccination [23], health
status of population outside the health care system [24], and
differences in medical care–seeking behavior across the
European Union (EU) [20].
However, such top-down model of citizen participation in
surveillance, specifically for research purposes, raises its own
set of ethical issues on top of those inherent in traditional forms.
Participants are involved actively in scientific research [2], but
researchers have limited personal interaction with participants
to ensure that they have indeed understood the research
information provided on the national platforms or mobile apps
and potential risks that their participation entails. In addition,
participants could be influenced by the promise of expected
benefits and the imperative of altruism. Therefore, it becomes
a challenge to combine protection of research participants with
the promotion of high-quality data collection for ethically
acceptable research purposes [25]. In participatory disease
surveillance systems, these are closely linked and mutually
dependent on each other. On the one hand, ensuring participants’
trust and engagement through adequate safeguards is crucial
for the sustainability and quality of these surveillance systems.
If participants perceive the risk of privacy violation, they might
refrain from giving important information, thus, affecting the
effectiveness of disease surveillance and subsequent future
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public health interventions [26]. On the other hand, if
surveillance systems follow low-quality standards and operate
outside an ethical framework, protection and collaborations of
data subjects cannot be secured. Numerous ethical frameworks
have been developed in the field of public health surveillance
and the use of big data [27-29]. However, a 2017 systematic
review on ethical issues of public health surveillance revealed
that there is a need for more context-specific analyses to guide
public health practice [5]. Consequently, providing an ethical
framework for the regulation of such innovative participatory
surveillance methods, using a real-world example, becomes of
utmost importance.
In this paper, we use Influenzanet to illustrate challenges in
protection of health and other sensitive information reported in
participatory disease surveillance systems. We discuss and
analyze challenges and needs of participant consent in
surveillance and research using participant surveillance systems
data. We argue that research ethics committee (RECs) should
play an important role in this developing field. Finally, we
propose a framework for the regulation of digital participatory
disease surveillance systems, which strengthens protection of
participants’ data and privacy, while promoting the concept of
justice.
Consent
Traditional Informed Consent in Internet-Based
Surveillance
In public health surveillance, there are 2 antithetical forces.
Although these systems pursue the improvement of population
health through surveillance of diseases (such as in the case of
Influenzanet, providing protection for vulnerable populations
at risk of serious adverse outcomes of influenza infection), they
must also safeguard individuals against any abuse of their data
by researchers [30,31]. To strike a balance between the pursuit
of societal welfare and protection of individual rights, consent
from participants plays a fundamental role. Originating from
the necessity to protect research subjects both physically and
mentally, written informed consent is traditionally obtained for
medical research, and its importance has emerged even more
in the current era of data protection [32]. However, this type of
consent seems to be poorly adapted to the collection and use of
digital data in public health surveillance [2].
In light of the inadequacy of traditional informed consent for
participatory public health surveillance, 1 potential response is
to reject the need for further consent in these types of studies
[33] because of the fact that participants enroll on their own and
not in continued medical contact. The “no problem” solution
rests also on the assumption that consent is not necessary, as in
public health surveillance, individual interests may be put aside
to protect the public good [33]. For example, in the United
States, the issue of consent in public health surveillance is
circumvented by considering the latter as public health practice
instead of research, thus exempting it from institutional review
boards’ approval [34] and in most cases, of traditional informed
consent requirements. Indeed, a participatory disease
surveillance platform active in the United States, Flu Near You,
received a waiver for informed consent [35]. However, this
approach may not be the best solution for participatory disease
surveillance where data are actively generated by participants,
underscoring the urgent need to adapt the traditional model of
informed consent more adequately to this type of surveillance
system.
Informed consent in research was originally designed for studies
involving a limited number of participants where it was
practically and financially feasible for researchers to engage
participants, provide details about the research, and obtain
written informed consent before the beginning of the study [32].
A further problem with traditional informed consent is that it
was designed to authorize the use of data only by those subjects
and for those purposes according to which the data had been
originally collected. It was, however, not intended to also cover
retrospective research on samples or data. In the case of big
data for surveillance of infectious diseases, which is often
retrospective in nature (2 out of the 3 electronic data sources
are medical encounter and nonhealth digital data) [12], obtaining
traditional informed consent proves problematic, as it requires
disclosing all potential risks of primary and retrospective
research, but the latter are usually unknown at the time when
data are collected [32].
There have been substantial efforts made by some Influenzanet
national platforms at their outset to ensure some form of personal
interaction with their participants to better explain the nature of
the surveillance system. In 2003, the original Belgian/Dutch
platform, called de Grote Griepmeting (ie, the Great Influenza
Survey), received a lot of media attention, which led to the
registration of tens of thousands of participants in 2003/2004.
The participants’ age distribution from youth to the elderly and
their wide geographic spread and different levels of education
made de Grote Griepmeting more accurate and quicker to signal
the onset of a flu epidemic than the general practitioners’
surveillance system organized by Netherlands Institute for
Health Services Research (NIVEL). The Belgian/Dutch research
team invited participants for an information, question and answer
session, where they were provided with notes on the rationale
of the survey questions to the flu survey study. Moreover, a
forum was also created where participants could ask any
remaining questions, and when specific virology questions were
asked, consultation would follow with partners from the NIVEL
and the National Institute for Health and Environment in the
Netherlands. The team managed to answer all incoming
questions from participants by email and during various local,
national, and regional live radio interviews from people listening
in. In 2009, the team started a public community on Facebook
named De Grote Griepmeting–Influenzanet, where members
would have their questions answered by the team. Such measures
(ie, the information session and the team answering all additional
questions received via email, through their forum, on the social
platform Facebook, and during radio interviews) could be
viewed as an equivalent solution to obtaining the informed
consent of these participants (De Grote Griepmeting, email
communication, April 3, 2018 and February 7, 2019).
The inadequacies of traditional informed consent have led to
the development of many other ethically acceptable solutions.
For instance, in retrospective research where risks are minimal,
consent would not be necessary as long as the right to opt out
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and the right to be forgotten are preserved and enforced [36,37].
Alternatively, the requirement of informed consent upholds but
is paired with waivers, which dispense researchers from
requesting consent for secondary use of data, if the recontacting
and reconsenting are unfeasible or would lead to
nonrepresentative samples [38].
Another alternative to traditional informed consent is an
extended version of consent, which is more suitable to public
health/big data research, known as broad or general consent
[2,32,39-41]. The key difference between traditional and broad
or general consent is that data subjects provide their consent for
entire classes of research [42]. This extended form of consent
differs from blanket consent as data subjects do not give
permission for any use of their data but rather define in broad
terms the purposes of use [42]. Moreover, broad consent is only
considered acceptable if 2 criteria are met. First, every new
study needs to be approved by an REC or another competent
entity [43]. Second, the right of participants to withdraw their
consent at any time has to be maintained [32,44]. Despite the
presence of these safeguards, consensus on whether broad
consent can be considered truly informed is lacking [45-47].
The informative nature of broad consent rests on the assumption
that autonomy is protected, as REC approval is necessary, and
strategies to regularly update the data donor on ongoing opt-out
opportunities are devised [48]. Furthermore, any modification
to the research should automatically lead to reconsenting
procedures [49]. However, broad consent cannot be entirely
informed because of the unspecified nature of future research
[48]. Although broad consent seems suitable for secondary uses
in public health research involving digital communities of
volunteer citizens or big data, it is uncertain whether broad
consent represents the best solution in terms of respect for
autonomy. Given the issues raised by broad consent and the
fact that it requires initial face-to-face contact, seeking consent
electronically could be an ethically satisfying alternative to
traditional informed consent.
Electronic Consent, An Adaptation of Traditional
Informed Consent
Electronic consent (e-consent) implies that participants give
informed consent using an information technology (eg, digital
technologies). In this sense, e-consent does not represent a new
form of consent but simply an adaptation of informed consent
to the electronic environment [50]. E-consent is currently being
used in the Influenzanet Consortium and in similar participatory
surveillance platforms such as Flu Tracking (Australia and New
Zealand) as a valid form of consent for participants. Data
subjects agree to the conditions, terms, and privacy policies
when registering on their respective national platforms [16,51].
Although e-consent offers the substantial benefit of a tailored
fit to the digital environment, it also has some inherent problems.
A unique feature of internet-based research is the absence of
personal interaction between researchers and participants, where
researchers would traditionally be able to provide individually
tailored information and answer any question participants might
ask concerning the study and the collection of health data.
Therefore, one of the major risks posed by e-consent is the
provision of consent through automatic processes in the digital
world, as parties are not directly involved. The provision of
consent is rather based on a set of computer rules determining
whether access to an individual’s data by researchers could be
granted on reasonable grounds [50]. For this reason, it is possible
that participants provide their consent without fully
understanding—or even reading—the information, terms, and
conditions that data collectors provide by simply clicking the
relevant buttons in the digital forms [52]. We thus recommend
that several precautions ought to be implemented when e-consent
is obtained. For instance, e-consent should be designed in such
a way that information is delivered through a simple PDF file
where participants digitally put their signature (instead of
clicking a button) to increase the likelihood of the document
being read. Alternatively, other possibilities offered by
information technology could be exploited to help verify
participants’ understanding of the information provided during
the e-consent process. These include tools such as the use of
audio files, PowerPoint presentations, videos, pictures, or
gamification (for instance, through quizzes and animation) [53].
Though the above recommendations could foster the informed
nature of e-consent, the lack of personal interaction between
study participants and researchers remains. Therefore, a properly
implemented e-consent would be particularly beneficial in those
studies where it is impossible to provide individual counseling
and where the conditions, terms, and privacy policies would
otherwise not be read [54,55]. In addition, one might even argue
that participants are potentially less likely to consent under
undue influence or constraints because of limited interaction
with researchers. They can thus easily decline consent by signing
out from the digital platforms whenever they feel the need to
do so [52]. In this regard, e-consent increases the autonomy of
participants.
Nonetheless, a further challenge raised by the absence of
face-to-face contact is how to ensure that participants have the
required legal capacity to legitimately give their e-consent after
they electronically authenticate [52], because of the difficulty
of verifying the participants’ identity. In this sense, even if
measures were taken—such as quizzes or questionnaires—to
ensure that participants have understood the research
information, there would be little guarantee that those quizzes
or study questionnaires are actually being completed by data
subjects. A potential solution to this authentication issue could
come from advances made in biometric identification
technologies, commonly used for security purposes [52]. For
instance, the use of face recognition technology [56] on
computers and mobile phones or fingerprint recognition sensor
in smartphones (eg, Touch ID by Apple Inc) could be used to
verify the identity of participants throughout the process of
e-consent. However, processing biometric data raises additional
ethical and legal issues, in particular with respect to privacy.
Biometric data, similar to genetic material, carries biological
traits that are unique to data subjects and which could be easily
used to reidentify them [57]. However, it must be noted that,
although entailing sensitive personal information, the processing
of biometric data can be lawful even without subjects’ consent
if processing serves the public interest or scientific or statistical
research purposes (eg, Article 9.2.(j) of the European General
Data Protection Regulation, GDPR) [58]. Ethical concerns with
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respect to biometric data might also be mitigated if, for example,
the gathered biometric information was stored locally on the
participants’ computers or mobile devices and not transmitted
to the research team or any third party.
In the case of multinational studies such as Influenzanet, an
adequately implemented e-consent could consist of a standard
informed consent information form [16], as a single PDF file,
being delivered to participants at the time of their registration
on the digital platform and followed by a new document each
and every time new information is added on the single country
websites. The information provided would have to be
reader-friendly and succinctly summarized, thus nudging
participants to read it thoroughly. Awareness of all potential
ramifications because of their participation could be further
improved through the provision of quiz questions. Grading of
these quiz questions could then serve as a proxy to ensure
adequate understanding of the informed consent information.
This method has been employed at the Harvard Personal
Genome Project (PGP) [59]. Participants were even provided
with a study guide and were required to pass an enrollment test
to be considered for the project. This additional burden to
participation, which is justified for genetic research (genetic
exceptionalism), should nonetheless remain minimal for
Influenzanet to retain engagement of its participants. This is
supported by the mildly sensitive nature of the gathered
information and the low risks associated with this kind of
surveillance. Indeed, the enrollment examination for the PGP
was the main barrier to participation, with almost 60% of its
users dropping out [59]. Digital signature of the consent form
could also be a more personalized alternative, and it would also
provide additional evidence on the identity of the participant,
which altogether would enhance the informed nature of this
e-consent procedure.
Protection of Subjects’ Privacy
Epidemics forecasting studies and other public health research
often gather useful and sensitive data on their participants,
potentially interfering with their privacy. In the case of
Influenzanet, protection of participants’ privacy is secured by
data anonymization and the use of a centralized database [18].
One might argue that full anonymization is not necessary for
some public health surveillance, as part of the collected data is
only mildly sensitive (eg, age group and gender) and thus poses
only a minor threat to the fundamental rights and the privacy
of participants even in case of misuse [60]. However, even
nonpersonal information could be used to reveal much more
sensitive information on data subjects if the former is coupled
with additional geographical information, which is often
collected by public health surveillance systems [61]. For
instance, 1 of the core functions of Influenzanet is to map cases
of ILI for the identification of hotspots of influenza outbreaks
to model disease progression and implement effective prevention
strategies. This spatiotemporal dimension of collected health
data can enhance the privacy-invasive nature of epidemics
forecasting research such as Influenzanet [62]. The collection
of sensor and usage data from smartphones adds additional
behavioral and context information, which, as shown in related
work [15], has the potential to improve forecasting and risk
analysis. Despite these potential benefits, even apparently
nonpersonal data, such as a list of installed apps, can be an
additional risk to the participant’s privacy [63]. The Consortium
took great care in protecting the privacy of its participants. In
case of sensor data, information is processed directly on the
user’s device and only transmitted to Influenzanet in anonymized
and highly aggregated form [15]. Location information of
reported cases is, for example, never mapped to the individual
level but rather to the postal code level [17], with only the
aggregate number of cases shown. Some platforms went even
further by randomizing virtual locations around the center of a
large number of postal code areas taken together (eg, the De
Grote Griepmeting platform). The grouping of postal codes
areas was paramount for better protection of the privacy of
participants, for example, in the case of a single participant in
a postal code area (De Grote Griepmeting, email communication,
April 3, 2018).
However, with increasing technological capabilities to integrate
and analyze health data with local data, there are risks of leakage
of sensitive information concerning participants’ locations,
which may lead to stigmatization of the particular locations as
well as residents [62,64]. Even with full anonymization,
cross-referencing of essential data gathered for epidemics
research purposes (eg, sex, age, and medical conditions) with
other databases could eventually lead to reidentification of data
subjects [2,65]. For instance, 2 researchers showed it was
feasible to reidentify individuals by matching a deidentified
database on Netflix movie recommendations to available
Web-based information (eg, Internet Movie Database) [66].
Hence, anonymization per se is not a sufficient measure to
adequately protect privacy. The long life span of some
anonymized datasets, which is often the case with epidemics
forecasting studies, de facto increases the risks of reidentification
and privacy breaches through repetitive data enrichment over
time [54]. Consequently, reidentification should be considered
a real risk for data subjects [2] even in case of anonymization.
It is, thus, paramount to ensure ethical and accountable sharing
of anonymized datasets between research institutions and to
combine anonymization with other adequate data security
measures to prevent misuse of data and unauthorized
reidentification.
Justice
The concept of justice in research ethics is fully embodied by
the policies of the Influenzanet Consortium as participation is
free, open, voluntary, and nondiscriminative of any resident of
the respective countries (except for Sweden, where some
representativeness and comparison purposes are guaranteed by
allowing participation through invitations only) [17]. This
ensures a fair distribution of risks and benefits to all research
participants and the public at large. If epidemics forecasting
studies keep up with the high standards in terms of justice (ie,
participation to the surveillance system is free, open, voluntary,
and nondiscriminative) followed by the Influenzanet Consortium
and similar platforms such as Flu Near You [35], the only
remaining challenge would be dealing with those limitations
on participation that are inherent to digital technologies. These
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limitations are commonly referred in the literature as the “ digital
divide ” [2,67], and they concern both access to and proficiency
with digital technologies. Access to digital technologies is also
a product of many sociodemographic elements such as age,
educational level of participants, ethnic groups, and their
socioeconomic status [68,69]. This is reflected in the data
collected by Influenzanet, which present an underrepresentation
of younger age and elderly groups, an overrepresentation of the
middle age group for both genders, and a higher educational
level of participants in comparison with the general population
[70]. In this respect, it could be claimed that epidemics
forecasting studies such as Influenzanet are potentially
empowering a more dynamic, informed societal group with a
penchant for digital technology, whereas at the same time
perpetuating the health inequalities between others [2]. However,
it must also be stressed that public health surveillance benefits
the public at large and not exclusively the participants. Public
health surveillance, like biomedical research, is a public good,
as the health benefits resulting from its interventions (based on
knowledge generated from data subjects) are ultimately going
to be shared with society [71]. In addition, the digital divide is
decreasing annually, with technology becoming more and more
pervasive [72]. Nevertheless, concerns about justice can be
avoided only if results and disease prevention strategies are
shared evenly and on a regular basis among all societal groups,
something which the Influenzanet Consortium is promoting (eg,
weekly national surveillance bulletins, regular press releases
during the study, and radio broadcasting) [73,74]. Such regular
results dissemination initiatives undeniably help in ensuring
that expected benefits of research are shared more equally
between societal groups. This could be further improved by
granting access to more targeted and granular information on
influenza activity to nonparticipants [74] under the concept of
solidarity [75]. Such measures would allow a better protection
of society as the spread of an influenza epidemic is an individual
as well as a collective concern.
Capacity Building for Research Ethics
Committees
Influenzanet and similar systems are faced with multifocal
ethical and legal issues. For the safeguard of data subjects,
appropriate oversight and specific regulation might be needed
in the future. Currently, such oversight is beyond the governance
capacity of RECs, as technological advances outpace national
regulatory frameworks and undermine the definitions of those
concepts—such as “anonymization,” “encryption,” and
“personally identifiable information” [55]—upon which RECs
rely. However, RECs should be actively involved in the design
and implementation of public health research involving digital
communities of volunteer citizens or big data. These RECs need
to act as safety nets to fill the gaps of the current regulatory
framework, which often dates back to an era where modern
computational and technological capabilities were not
foreseeable [55]. In this perspective, we recommend RECs to
undergo interdisciplinary capacity building in those innovative
research methods through mutual exchange of information and
training with citizen science experts, big data researchers, data
scientists, ethicists, legal experts, and sociologists. This would
allow the identification of ethical and legal grey zones.
Stakeholders could further anticipate potential conflicting
situations resulting from the enactment of new legislation. This
appears even more urgent as we have entered the GDPR era.
This regulation came into force in May 2018, to replace the EU
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC [1,76]. The GDPR tries to
harmonize EU data protection laws with the goal of guaranteeing
the same level of freedom and protection to EU citizens, while
protecting personal data during cross-border sharing with
international organizations and third countries [76]. This
legislative reform is likely to have a considerable impact on
consent requirements and exemptions from obtaining consent
[1]. This could affect the expected benefits that big data can
bring to society by increasing the regulatory burden on public
health surveillance studies [1]. Furthermore, as stressed in the
study by Mittelstadt, the GDPR classifies “data concerning
health” as a “special category of personal data” [77]. As this
category includes any personal data that reveals information on
the health status (physical or mental) of participants [77],
health-related information gathered from Influenzanet
participants or similar epidemics forecasting studies
might—until properly anonymized—fall in this special category.
It is, thus, possible that detailed limitations to health data usage
are imposed in the future because of the protective stance
endorsed by the GDPR [77]. Therefore, interdisciplinary
capacity building and acquaintance of RECs with this innovative
and developing research field will be paramount to proactively
ensure an adequate protection of data subjects while preventing
the development of additional research barriers. Such barriers
could undermine the excellent contribution to the preservation
of public health made by epidemics forecasting systems such
as Influenzanet.
Ethical Framework for the Regulation of
Participatory Disease Surveillance
Systems
We propose the following 4 components ethical framework to
provide guidance on how to ensure an adequate ethical oversight
of participatory disease surveillance systems while safeguarding
participants’ privacy and eliminating barriers to the work of
these surveillance platforms (Table 1).
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Table 1. Ethical framework for the regulation of participatory disease surveillance systems.
ConsiderationsEthical componentPrinciple
Standard, reader-friendly, and multilingual informed consent form with
succinctly summarized information (eg, as a single PDF file) delivered at
the time of registration and each time new information is added to the
digital platforms
Electronic consentAutonomy of participants
Informed nature of consent can be fostered through the provision of a few
quiz questions to reduce the risk of participants simply “clicking through”
the consent process
Require digital signature of the consent form to incentivize participants
to read the information form and as evidence of their identity
Making participants aware of the fact that despite best effort to protect
their privacy, the residual risk of a privacy leak cannot be ruled out
Anonymization of participants’ data should be combined with other data
security measures such as a highly protected centralized database for
storage of participants’ data
Protection of participants’ privacyNonmaleficence
Location data of participants should never be mapped to the individual
level but rather to the postal code level to reduce the risk of reidentification
in case of rare value entries
Sensor data from mobile phones should only be transmitted in anonymized
and highly aggregated form
Ensure ethical and accountable sharing of anonymized datasets between
research institutions to reduce reidentification risks for participants through
database triangulation
Free, open, and nondiscriminative participation should be offered to
members of the general public
Access to information on disease
activity and prevention strategies
Justice
Disease prevention strategies and results obtained through the participatory
surveillance platforms should be disseminated on a regular basis to mem-
bers of the public through various means
Interdisciplinary capacity building of RECs is required to keep up with
technological advances, thereby ensuring an adequate protection of data
subjects
Research ethics committees (RECs)Beneficence and nonmaleficence
RECs should play a proactive role in the design and implementation of
public health research involving digital communities of volunteer citizens
RECs should act as safety nets to prevent barriers to public health
surveillance by identifying ethico-legal grey zones and anticipate potential
conflicting situations resulting from the evolving legal landscape
Conclusions
In the developing field of participatory disease surveillance
systems, the main ethical dilemma is how to ensure adequate
protection of data subjects while at the same time obtaining the
full benefits that public health surveillance directly involving
digital communities of citizens could bring. In this complex
situation, 1 of the key ethical safeguards proposed in our
framework is a properly implemented e-consent. To pursue this
objective, national platforms of the Influenzanet Consortium
will put continuous effort in enhancing and adequately
developing their e-consent procedures. Current e-consent
procedures could be improved by providing standard,
reader-friendly, multilingual information about the study,
participants’ rights, the risks associated with their participation,
and, in addition, a short series of quiz questions to verify proper
understanding of the potential benefits and risks. Furthermore,
requiring participants to digitally sign the Web-based consent
form could both serve as a motivation for them to read properly
the information provided and as a solution to allow personal
identification. However, such additional burdens of participation
need to remain minimal to ensure the sustainability of the
platforms.
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